



ROYAL HIGH INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE  
CENTER FOR SECURITY AND DEFENCE STUDIES

## Focus Paper 10



# The evolving ideology of the global jihad: a discursive approach

---

STEFAN DECONINCK<sup>1</sup>

*June 2009*

*The views expressed are only those of the author*

### Abstract

In this contribution, we will discuss developments in jihad ideology. First, we will take the reader on a journey back in time, to frame the origin of doctrines concerning jihad in classical Islam and the fundamentals of Islamic law. Then, we will focus on the emergence of political Islam, its radicalisation and the new doctrines on jihad that it brought about. We will see how 'international jihad' emerged as a very special strain of radical political Islam, with al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden as its best known protagonists.

We will then zoom in on the discourses of the global jihad, employed to attract radical Muslims into their violent struggle against the enemy. We discuss the explicitly political, pragmatic and secular discourse of the so-called second generation of global jihadis, which sings a different tune than the messages that we know from al-Qaida figures like bin Laden or Zawahiri who still embed their call for violent struggle in a religious, Islamic context. It is a discourse that seems to catch on with especially radical youths.

Finally, we will look into the possibilities to utilize discourse as a tool for strategies to counter radicalisation or jihadisation.

---

<sup>1</sup> Researcher at the Royal High Institute for Defence, [Stefan.Deconinck@mil.be](mailto:Stefan.Deconinck@mil.be) (Center for Security and Defence Studies - Website: <http://www.mil.be/rdc>)

## 1. JIHAD AS A DOCTRINE IN CLASSICAL ISLAM<sup>2</sup>

The main source for Muslims on the doctrine of jihad is the *sunna*, the basis for Islamic law as it can be found in the Qur'an and *hadith*.

The Qur'an is for Muslims the literary word of God, passed on to Muhammed through the archangel Gabriel. Various chapters or *sura* in the Qur'an deal with aspects of fighting and war. Even during the lifetime of Mohammed, theory on jihad reflected the changes in the position and status of the Muslim communities within their society. As Mohammed and the early Muslims faced persecution by their clansmen and kinsmen in Mecca, who violently opposed his ideas about god and society, the early Muslim community was confronted with first animosity and had to behave prudent and defensive. Later, after Mohammed had to seek shelter (*hijra*) together with his first Companions in the oasis settlement of Yatrib (later renamed into Medina, the city of the Prophet) in 622 AD, or year 1 of the Muslim calendar, the atmosphere changed. Gradually, Mohammed managed to impose himself as a mediator between the Medina tribes and he became a man of position in the oasis. Along with their political power, Muslims gathered military forces necessary to confront the Meccans. The *sura* that date from the times of the battles with the Meccan armies and the first wars of conquest of Arabia reflect the new political environment. They include solutions to new practical problems that came together with conquest and victory in battle: how to engage an enemy, what to do with prisoners-of-war or with the possessions of the defeated, how to share the spoils of war, how to rule territory and non-Muslim populations, etc.

As long as Mohammed was there to receive divine messages, theory of war and jihad could be brought in accordance with circumstances on the ground. But after Mohammed's death in 632, other ways had to be explored in order to determine God's plan with mankind in the absence of His Messenger. This gave rise to a huge number of traditions or *hadith*. Based on the idea that everything the prophet did (or abstained from doing) and said (or remained silent about) was in accordance with the will of God, the deeds and sayings of the prophet were the ultimate acts of right Islamic behaviour and could therefore be used as additional sources of Islamic law. As such, the *hadith* as the Companions passed them on to the next generation, were used to clarify passages from the Qur'an or to deduce directions for issues that were not explicitly mentioned in the Book. The fast expansion of Islam beyond the geographic boundaries of the Arab peninsula, subduing large populations with different languages, cultures and religions like Byzantines and Persians, made additional regulations on Islamic 'law of war' very urgent. Hadith collections, compiled by legal scholars in the 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> century, for the first time mentioned the concept of *jihad* as war. Books like *Kitab al-Jihad* contained solutions to questions related to martyrdom, the use of weapons that cause great collateral damage to non-combatants (like onagers and ballistas), and practical rules of war and diplomacy such as declaring war against non-believers, concluding truces and cease-fires or accepting non-believers as allies in battle. Eventually, legal scholars could reach for interpretations and reasoning along analogies (*ijtihad*) to solve an issue even when the tradition of words and deeds of the prophet offered insufficient clarity.

New developments on jurisprudence or *fiqh* on *jihad* mainly came from scholars living in frontier areas where the military confrontation with non-believers was the fiercest. The 11<sup>th</sup> to the 14<sup>th</sup> century was an era of great turmoil in Islamic history, which was especially the case in al-Andalus or Spain, Syria and Sicily where Islam was pushed into the defensive against Christian *reconquistadores* and crusaders, and on the eastern borders in Central-Asia, Persia and Iraq where Mongols ravaged the

---

<sup>2</sup> This review of the development of jihad doctrines is based on the excellent analyses of David Cook and Michael Bonner. Cook, D., *Understanding jihad*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 2005, 259 p. Bonner M., *Jihad in Islamic history*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006, 197 p.

cultural heartland of Islam. Doctrines of *jihad* and rules in war became more radical, when some previous reservations on practices in battle and conquest, like the use of indiscriminate violence, were dropped. Discussions arose on the duty to wage a jihad, on an individual or collective base, when Islamic land (*dar al-Islam*) was threatened or conquered, and whether Muslims should continue to live in land that was lost to the enemy (*dar al-harb*). It is this more radical approach to *jihad* which inspires radical Muslims nowadays in their views on the current turmoil of the Islamic world. A scholar like ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) is frequently used by modern radicals as a source of inspiration for resistance against an 'apostate' ruler.<sup>3</sup> Taymiyya accused the new Mongol ruler in Syria of being a false Muslim (the act of *takfir*), despite the latter's conversion to Islam, because the Mongol prince combined aspects of Islamic religion with alien customs and thus corrupted true Islam<sup>4</sup>. He declared that obedience was no longer obliged and a *jihad* was justified against this apostate and heretic ruler. Although a scholar, he suited the action to the word and took up his sabre against the Mongols. Analogously, *takfir* has now become a dominant aspect in the radical doctrine of jihad and resistance against the state in the modern Islamic world.

## 2. ISLAMISM AND THE RADICALISATION OF JIHAD DOCTRINES

At the end of the 19th century, the Islamic world increasingly came under Western political and economic dominance. A new ideology, salafism, called for a revival of the values of the *salafi*, the earliest Islamic community that proved successful and superior to the surrounding civilisations. In following these practices, the salafists hoped to inspire Muslims to restore prosperity and glory for the Muslims. The most important theoreticians of the salafist movement were the Persian Al-Afghani, the Egyptian Abduh and the Syrian Rida. They observed the developments of their time from an anti-imperialistic perspective. Although these thinkers did not contribute to new insights in the theory of jihad, they laid the foundation of more radical thinking of movements that call themselves salafist, today<sup>5</sup>. The influential Egyptian author and Islamist Sayyid Qutb (1906-1969) is often cited as the link between the original salafists and these so-called neo-salafists. Qutb rejected the bottom-up strategy for Islamisation of the state by peaceful means through political activism, as organisations like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt propagated it. In his view, as expressed in his most famous book *Milestones*, the regimes in Muslim countries all fell for Western ideologies like nationalism and socialism and therefore made *sharia* subordinate to their secular laws and rules. These regimes and the societies in which they flourish dwell in a state of *jahiliyya*<sup>6</sup>. In order to defend their own interests against those of Islam, the secular rulers would issue their laws and regulations, which lead to tyranny, oppression and thus absence of freedom. According to Qutb, freedom can only unfold when man subdues himself to the rules of God; Muslims therefore have to fight *jahiliyya* and overthrow these secular regimes to free themselves from oppression. In his modern update of the concept, Qutb described jihad as a violent means to remove obstructions on the road to an Islamic state. Its target is not the West, as the source of these non-Islamic ideologies, but the *dar al-jahiliyya* or the apostate regimes. Qutb's criticisms of the authorities

---

<sup>3</sup> See for instance the following Islamist websites. Quraan Sunnah Education Programs, with a special issue on 'The life, struggles, works and impact of shaikh ul-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah', [http://www.qsep.com/modules.php?name=assunnah&d\\_op=viewassunnah&id=31](http://www.qsep.com/modules.php?name=assunnah&d_op=viewassunnah&id=31); Discussion on ibn Taymiyya on Islamic Board, <http://www.islamicboard.com/islamic-history-biographies/33892-ibn-taymiyyah.html>

<sup>4</sup> In fact, he accused the ruler of a violation of the rule of *tawhid* or the oneness of God., caused by accepting other regulations next to those based on Islamic (and thus divine) law.

<sup>5</sup> De Waal A., *Islamism and its enemies in the Horn of Africa*. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 24; Kepel G., *Jihad: the trail of political Islam*. London, I.B. Tauris, 2002, pp. 219-220; Renders M., *De schaduwkant van de maan: islamisme in politiek, economie, maatschappij en het wereld-systeem*. Gent, Academia Press, 1999, pp. 56-57.

<sup>6</sup> *Jahiliyya* refers to the state of unconsciousness in which the Arabs dwelled before they were called to Islam by the prophet Muhammed.

and his call for an Islamic revolution lead to his imprisonment, trial and execution by the regime of Nasser. This made him a true martyr for the cause of the Islamic state and a source of inspiration for future generations of radical youth, who were disillusioned in the failure of the ideologies of nationalism and socialism, which brought their country independence but not freedom and prosperity.<sup>7</sup>

Egypt continued to play a vital role in these developments. Groups like the *Tanzim al-Jihad* (also known as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad or EIJ) made jihad a key element in their struggle for an Islamic society. They considered jihad against the apostate a personal duty of each Muslim and saw themselves as a vanguard in the fight against the government. They succeeded in assassinating president Anwar Sadat in 1981, which they hated for his repression of Muslim organisations in Egypt and his peace agreement with Israel. But in the aftermath of the attack they were unsuccessful in overthrowing the state. The *tanzim* members were prosecuted and imprisoned, their leadership executed. Amongst them was Mohammed Faraj, author of a document called *al-Farida al-Gha'iba* (The neglected duty) that contained some basic ideas on the struggle against the government.<sup>8</sup> Thanks to the high profile of the assassination of Sadat, this pamphlet grew out to be a major political manifesto for this new generation of radical salafists in Syria, Algeria or Morocco.

'The neglected duty' in the title of the document refers to the individual duty to fight an apostate regime, which was neglected by the Muslims. Its argument is typical for this new generation of salafists, who, as self-made *sheikhs*, seized a religious status that was previously reserved for Islamic scholars or *ulema*. Their 'scholarly' argument is based on a copy-paste from those *hadith* and *fatawa* to suit their own cause. Faraj, a civil engineer, rejected the position of leading Islamic scholars that legitimate *jihad* was impossible in the absence of an imam or religious leader (which was the case since the abolishment of the khalifate in the aftermath of the first World War). In his eyes, this was a false argument, a pretext to neglect the duty of jihad. His reading of some *fatawa* issued by ibn Taymiyya (more than 600 years earlier) learnt him that Muslims could appoint such a leader themselves when circumstances called for a *jihad* against an apostate ruler.

### 3. FROM THE NEAR ENEMY TO THE FAR ENEMY: EMERGENCE OF THE IDEOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL JIHAD

Although they stepped outside the orthodoxy of Islamic law when they bestowed themselves as self-made sheikhs with scholarly legitimacy, these radical islamists stayed more or less within the lines of mainstream Islam with regard to the doctrine of jihad against apostates. They applied the doctrine of *takfir* on apostate rulers, which made government officials, security forces and other representatives of the secular state as their legitimate targets.

But in the 1980s, radical salafism entered a new stage in its jihad, now clearly leaving the path of classical Islamic law. The concept of jihad against *jahiliyya* was widened, not only targeting apostate regimes but the society as a whole. Because *tanzim* groups realised that their call to Islamic revolution was not voluntarily picked up by the Muslim masses, they saw it their duty to force society into submission to their interpretation of true Islam. Journalists, writers and artists became legitimate targets

---

<sup>7</sup> Cook D. *Understanding jihad*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 2005, pp. 103-105; Bonner M., *Jihad in Islamic history*, p. 162; De Waal A., *Islamism and its enemies in the Horn of Africa*, p. 30; Keppel G., *Jihad: the trail of political Islam*, pp 24-25; DeLong-Bas N., *Wahhabi Islam: from revival and reform to global jihad*. London, I.B. Tauris, 2004, p. 261.

<sup>8</sup> H. Jansen, *The neglected duty*, New York, MacMillan, 1986, pp. 202-203.

in this jihad, as well as ordinary citizens, women who were not properly dressed, girls going to school, youngsters playing football, people who happened to be at the wrong place at the wrong time. Jihad against society led to an intense conflict in Egypt, and a civil war in Algeria, costing tens of thousands of lives.

Meanwhile, a textbook defensive jihad was fought in Afghanistan, after the communist takeover in 1978 and the subsequent Soviet invasion in December 1979.

The success of the Afghan resistance has inspired thousands of Arab volunteers to serve as *mujahid* in the Afghan war and fight the enemy. In accordance with the classical Islamic tradition, a defensive jihad was waged against those who threatened the Islamic heartland. It was considered the individual duty of all Muslims to join their fellow believers into battle. Not only fighting contributed to the jihad, but also other forms of support were part of the effort, such as financial and logistical assistance to the combatants. The liberation of the country from the hands of the infidels was their primary target, and most of the *mujahideen* lacked the practical agenda of the salafi jihadists<sup>9</sup>.

One of the leading figures in organising the resistance was the Palestinian scholar Abd' Allah Yusuf Azzam (1941-1989). When he arrived in Peshawar (Pakistan) in 1979, he was one of the many Arabs that wanted to devote themselves to the recovery of Afghanistan for Islam. With his status as *sheikh* or scholar of Islamic law he was able to authorize the struggle of the *mujahid* as a genuine jihad according to Islamic law.<sup>10</sup>

In Peshawar, the Pakistani repository for mujahedin from all over the Muslim world, Azzam founded the *Bayt ul-Ansar*, a service to support the fighters in Afghanistan. Bayt ul-Ansar took care of the daily livelihood and shelter for newly arrived mujahedin. The operation was extended in 1984 under the *Maktab Khadamat*, a logistics service for the mujahedin in training camps. Azzam received this financial support from Saudi Arabia (humanitarian organizations, members of the royal family, intelligence) and intelligence agencies of Pakistan and the United States. Azzam traveled around the Middle East and the US to recruit volunteers and collect funds. In this way he became known as a focal point for jihad against the Soviet Union.

In his *fatwa* or legal opinion from 1983, "*Difa'(al-) 'an aradi al-muslimin ahamm furud al-a'yan*" ('The defence of Muslim lands is the most important individual duty'), he declared the war in Afghanistan a defensive jihad, to which every Muslim has to contribute until the land was re-conquered. "There is no permission for anyone from the other, even the child goes out without the permission of his parents, the wife without the permission of her husband, and the debtor without the permission of his creditor."<sup>11</sup> Azzam relied on ibn Taymiyya, whom he paraphrased in the title of his fatwa: "*The first obligation after faith is the repulsion of the enemy aggressor who assaults the religion and the worldly affairs*".<sup>12</sup>

Notwithstanding these explicit references to ibn Taymiyya on the defensive jihad, Azzam refused to follow ibn Taymiyya in his jihad doctrine of *takfir* against the apostate ruler. One of the possible explanations is pragmatism. According to Gerges, Azzam depended too much on Arab regimes for the funding of his activities in Pakistan – regimes that were labelled as apostates by radical salafists. Overt criticism would have ended this stream of money for his jihad organisation.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, Azzam found

---

<sup>9</sup> Gerges F., *The far enemy: why the jihad went global*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 81.

<sup>10</sup> Religioscope, *Biography of Sheikh Abdullah Azzam*, via [http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam\\_defence\\_2\\_intro.htm](http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_defence_2_intro.htm) (last visited on 14/2/2009)

<sup>11</sup> Azzam A., *Defence of muslim lands*, via [http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam\\_defence\\_5\\_chap3.htm](http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_defence_5_chap3.htm) (last visited on 14/2/2009); Gerges F., *The far enemy*, p. 135.

<sup>12</sup> Azzam A., *Defence of muslim lands*, via [http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam\\_defence\\_3\\_chap1.htm](http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_defence_3_chap1.htm) (last visited on 14/2/2009)

<sup>13</sup> Gerges F., *The far enemy*, p. 135.

the necessary arguments in Islamic jurisdiction to enable him to aspect financial support even from infidels, like the United States – which was acceptable according to Islamic law as long as this support was essential for the success of the jihad.<sup>14</sup>

For Azzam, the war in Afghanistan was part of a broader agenda. He saw jihad as an international struggle to defend the *dar al-Islam*, with the liberation of Palestine as a final reward. His mujahedin were not intended as a terrorist network but as a regular fighting force, a kind of Islamic 'Foreign Legion' which could be deployed as a rapid intervention force anywhere in the world where Muslims were threatened by the infidel enemy. This is the solid basis (*al-Qaida al-Sulbah*) on which Islamic society can be built, as Azzam explained in his work "Join the caravan":

*"The establishment of the Muslim community on an area of land is a necessity, as vital as water and air. This homeland will not come about without an organised Islamic movement which perseveres consciously and realistically upon Jihad, and which regards fighting as a decisive factor and as a protective wrapping. The Islamic movement will not be able to establish the Islamic community except through a common, people's Jihad which has the Islamic movement as its beating heart and deliberating mind."*<sup>15</sup>

Meanwhile, Egyptian *tanzim* groups like the Egyptian Islamic Jihad also gathered in Pakistan, seeking a temporary refuge from persecution by the Egyptian government. At this 'solid base', they wanted to take a breath and reconsider their options to continue their jihad in Egypt. This is how Ayman al-Zawahiri, the future top leader of al-Qaida, came in touch with Azzam, his support system for the jihad in Afghanistan and his Saudi financiers, amongst them Osama bin Laden. But their different approaches led to an unbridgeable disagreement between Azzam and Zawahiri on the future course to take with the mujahideen movement after their victory over the Soviet Union and its Afghan client. Azzam warned explicitly for premature action against the apostate government, such as the fight that the Salafi jihadis in Egypt claimed: *"There are the handful of officers, some of whom may think that it is possible for them to carry out a collective Muslim effort - this is a kind of fantasy or delusion reminiscent of the past. It will be no more than a repetition of the tragedy of Abdel Nasser with the Islamic Movement once again."*<sup>16</sup> He issued a *fatwa* in which he declared the use of mujahideen resources against other Muslims as un-Islamic.

Zawahiri, who thought more in terms of revolutionary violence against apostate rulers in Muslim countries, gained more and more influence on Osama bin Laden who eventually became a major financier of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. In November 1989, Azzam was killed by a bomb in his car, which resolved this dispute in favour of Zawahiri and the salafist 'national' jihad.

When the communist regime in Kabul finally collapsed in 1992, the foreign mujahideen returned home. These 'Afghan Arabs', who had gained military experience in battle and who were ideologically trained in the salafist views on jihad, joined the ranks of the *tanzim* groups in their home countries. These salafist mujahideen fought their near enemy only within the boundaries of their own country. Although often internationally interconnected through comradeship and shared experiences in Afghanistan, they cannot yet be considered as an international jihad movement.

The first Gulf War of 1990-1991 triggered the next stage in the development of the radical salafist jihad doctrine. Osama bin Laden offered the Saudi kingdom his mujahideen as protection against a

---

<sup>14</sup> Azzam A., Defence of muslim lands: Sixth Question: can we seek help from the Mushrikun if we are in a weak condition?, via [http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam\\_defence\\_6\\_chap4.htm](http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_defence_6_chap4.htm) (last visited on 14/2/2009)

<sup>15</sup> Azzam A., "Join the Caravan", [http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam\\_caravan\\_3\\_part1.htm](http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_caravan_3_part1.htm) - Establishing a solid foundation as a base for Islam.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

possible Iraqi invasion, but he was turned down. Instead, the king called on Coalition troops to defend his territory. In the eyes of bin Laden, the king surrendered the country of the Two Mosques into the hands of the infidels. He concluded that it was not enough to fight apostate rulers to safeguard Islam, as their regimes were only puppets on a string. To be successful in establishing true Islamic societies, the master puppeteer had to be targeted. Zawahiri and his Egyptian Islamic Jihad had to give up their efforts to topple the regime of Mubarak in Egypt, an enterprise that was counterproductive in the eyes of bin Laden: it hardly affected the Egyptian government, stirred growing opposition among the population and therefore harmed the image of the jihad.

Thus the doctrine of the far enemy was born. In August 1996, it was formalised in the '*Declaration of War against the Americans occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places*', published by Osama bin Laden (see further below).

In February 1998, a statement was issued by the *World Islamic Front against the Crusaders and the Jews* (WIF). It contained a fatwa, calling for the liberation of Mecca and Jerusalem, and the killing of Americans – both military and civilians – as the individual duty of each Muslim:

*"The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies - civilians and military - is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. (...) We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson."*<sup>17</sup>

The short statement was signed by a number of key figures of the jihad movements: 'sheikh' Osama bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri ('amir of the Tanzim in Egypt'), Abu-Yasir Rifa'i Ahmad Taha of the Jamaa'a Islamiyya in Egypt (Egyptian Islamic Group or EIG), Sheikh Mir Hamzah of the Pakistani Jamiat-il-Ulema and Fazlul Rahman, 'amir of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh'. The group pretended to be an umbrella organisation under the guidance of Osama bin Laden for jihad groups that previously acted only at a national level. It was an attempt by bin Laden to monopolise the transnational jihad movement and to direct it into a jihad against the far enemy. He did not succeed to impose his vision of a centralised international jihad. Some groups refused to give up their national jihad, like the GIA in Algeria or the Jamaa al-Islamiya in Pakistan; the Egyptian Islamic Group even withdrew its support and Taha was let down by his own organisation. Other groups were battle-weary and wanted to introduce some breathing space to reconsider their position towards jihad against the government.

Consequently, bin Laden's claim on leadership was rejected and his strategy for centrally guided jihad against the US and their allies dismissed by a significant share of jihadis. The World Islamic Front thus never became the single player in the field of international jihad. The jihad current never existed as a monolithic movement. Although bin Laden's organisation (which we might call 'Al Qaida' from now on, especially after the Egyptian Islamic Jihad of Zawahiri dissolved itself in this organization) became the best known international jihad groups, its strategy, tactics and means remain contested. Senior jihad strategists like Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Setmariam Nasar (alias Abu Mus'ab al-Suri) fiercely opposed bin Laden's option to challenge the US militarily. In the eyes of Al-Suri (a Syrian 'national' jihadi with a record of achievements as veteran of the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union, supporter of the GIA, propagandist 'behind enemy lines' in London and trainer of mujahideen in Taliban-governed Afghanistan), this strategy would pose a threat to the existence of the Taliban emirate, an essential

---

<sup>17</sup> Originally published in the London newspaper *Al-Quds al-Arabi* on June 23 1998. English translation on the website of Cornell University Library: <http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/fatw2.htm>

stronghold and springboard for the global jihad.<sup>18</sup> Additionally, he opposes the idea of a centralised jihad, which is in his eyes too hierarchical and therefore too vulnerable to prosecution by government agencies. Al-Suri developed a strategy of decentralised jihad, where independent cells can operate autonomously from each other. What connect these cells is not a common leadership but a common goal and programme. In this type of jihad, the location of the battleground where jihad takes place does not matter any more: this can be a Muslim country or somewhere in Europe. Jihad, in this decentralised way, became truly global.

Al-Suri distanced himself from the al-Qaida structure, but remained in Afghanistan to support the Taliban until he was forced to flee, after the American attack on the regime in October 2001.<sup>19</sup>

#### 4. DISCOURSES IN GLOBAL JIHAD

As shown by historical framework above, the concept of jihad underwent some major modifications under the influence of radical islamism, especially in the wake of the emergence of the doctrine of global jihad. It evolved from an approach that still fitted the 'classical' scholarly legal framework of mainstream Islam to a radical salafist interpretation.

This evolution can be observed, among other things, in the discourses that are being utilised around the interpretation of jihad. When we look at statements, writings and messages that are produced by global jihadis, we can distinguish a variety of 'text' in which their ideologies and doctrines are expressed.<sup>20</sup> It is an interesting exercise to analyse these discourses, as they reveal some basic insight in the intentions and practices of the global jihad movement. These insights might contribute to the discussion on this role of ideology in radicalisation of Muslims towards violent salafism, and how to address this problem from a policy point of view.

In the discursive analysis of global jihad, a clear distinction should be made between three components.

The first component is the 'sender' of text, the people that initiate discursive acts on global jihad. Hegghammer distinguished 5 categories of senders: the leaders of 'old al-Qaida' (like bin Laden and Zawahiri), religious scholars who are engaged in the global jihad (the 'jihad sheikhs'), strategic thinkers, militant organisations (whether or not in franchise with al-Qaida), and grassroots radicals.<sup>21</sup>

Second, there are the 'receivers' of the text, the targets of the discourse, that fall into five categories: the Muslim community or Umma, fellow jihadis, the near (the apostate government), the far enemy (the West) and the broader public within enemy states.

A third component is the type of 'text' that is produced by global jihadis. This is very diverse, like messages on video (dispersed by satellite news channels and jihad internet sites), inside strategic discussions, lectures and briefings, interviews, or postings on internet discussion groups.

---

<sup>18</sup> Lia B., *Architect of the global Jihad: the life of al-Qaida strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri*. New York, Columbia University Press, 2008, pp. 237-239.

<sup>19</sup> Al-Suri elaborates on his ideas of the decentralized, global jihad in his *Da'wat al-Moqawma al-Islamiyah* (The call for global Islamic resistance), an opus of 1604 pages, finished shortly before he was captured in Quetta – Pakistan in 2004. See Lia B., *Architect of the global Jihad*, for an extensive discussion of this document.

<sup>20</sup> As 'text', we take all verbal and non-verbal communications, like written text, spoken text, gestures, sounds and images.

<sup>21</sup> Hegghammer T., 'Global jihadism after Iraq war', in: *Middle East Journal*, 60, 1, 2006, pp. 15-17.

Based on the multitude of combinations (different senders, targeting different receivers through different ways for the transmission of text), we might expect that there is not one single discourse of 'the global jihad' but a wide variety. Below, we will discuss some examples, like the 'Declaration of War against the Americans occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places' by Osama bin Laden and the so-called 'jihadi strategic studies' by Yusuf Al-Ayiri, Abu Bakr Naji and Abu Mus'ab al-Suri.

On 23 August 1996, bin Laden issued a '*Declaration of War against the Americans occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places*'.<sup>22</sup> It is the first document in which al-Qaida put its doctrine of jihad against the far enemy into words.

The first major discursive act is the nature of the text, which is called a '*fatwa*' by bin Laden. As bin Laden is not a sheikh, he clearly seizes this symbolic capital and status, which enables him to declare his violent struggle a legal jihad. This also enhances his own standing vis-à-vis true sheikhs that might criticise him or fellow jihadi leaders that might challenge his position.

Bin Laden's main target audience in this 'declaration of war' is the world wide Muslim community (cf. also the fact that the text was published in Arabic). Bin Laden reminds them of their fellow believers all over the world, for which the alliance of Zionists and Crusaders is responsible. He then focuses on Saudi Arabia, where the regime turns a deaf ear to the needs of the population, which results in worsening economic conditions, deteriorating security and loss of genuine Islam. The fundamental explanation is the presence of American troops on the territory of the kingdom. Referring to ibn Taymiyya, he calls for a jihad to repel this enemy - a collective duty for each Muslim:

*"The regime is fully responsible for what had been incurred by the country and the nation; however the occupying American enemy is the principle and the main cause of the situation. (...) Under such circumstances, to push the enemy-the greatest Kufr- out of the country is a prime duty. No other duty after Belief is more important than the duty of jihad. Utmost effort should be made to prepare and instigate the Ummah against the enemy, the American-Zionist alliance-occupying the country of the two Holy Places and the route of the Apostle to the Furthest Mosque".*

Then he warns against an internal fight amongst Muslims, for this will weaken them and strengthen the enemy. Americans and Zionists would exploit the damage to the Arab/Muslim infrastructure and economic interests (especially oil production) to their own advantage. Because of the military predominance of the US, jihad has to be conducted as a guerrilla war, not a regular fight between armies. Bin Laden also points to an economic boycott as a means to wage jihad: "*To deny these occupiers from the enormous revenues of their trading with our country is a very important help for our Jihad against them. To express our anger and hate to them is a very important moral gesture.*" Especially women can add thus to the effort of the fighting mujahideen: "*If economical boycotting is intertwined with the military operations of the Mujahideen, then defeating the enemy will be even nearer, by the Permission of Allah.*" Only at the end of the document, bin Laden addresses the Americans, and reminds them that the mujahideen are ready for another fight, as the Soviets and Serbs already have experienced in Afghanistan and Bosnia. He assures them that mujahideen will also drive them out of Saudi Arabia. But here also, it is clear that the international Muslim community is the main target audience.

In the text, we find some references to Qur'an verses and *hadith*, but no in-depth elaboration of religious arguments to support the call for a jihad (in fact, this is not really necessary for a fatwa, which is more a legal ruling than an exegesis of the scripture). Moreover, the arguments are surprisingly

---

<sup>22</sup> This text was first published in the London-based newspaper *Al Quds Al Arabi* on 23/8/1996.

secular, referring to economic conjuncture, military strategies and mere politics. It is surprising, because this secular discourse is a feature often overlooked by scholars in the field of jihad terrorism.

In their article *Jihadi strategic studies: the alleged al Qaida policy study preceding the Madrid bombings* Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, researchers at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment are among the first to describe a new phenomenon in jihadist literature. Based on a document, which dates from the autumn of 2003 and which can be attributed to al-Qaida, they describe the development of a new approach towards fighting by jihadist groups<sup>23</sup>. The document refers to the use of the electoral climate in Spain, a moment in which their opponent is in a politically weak position, to plan actions that are intended to destabilize the enemy. Lia and Hegghammer coined this kind of text 'jihadi strategic studies', a terminology that effectively has been introduced in scholarly studies on jihad terrorism.

In terms of content, the jihadi strategic studies (JSS) hardly differ from 'classical' Western strategic analysis. They apply knowledge and understandings derived from academic conflict literature, theory of international relations and various policy papers, to critically examine jihadi strategies and discuss the *lessons learned* by their opponents. Their purpose is to enhance the effectiveness of the jihad. The language of jihadi strategic studies is that of traditional security studies, and it employs concepts such as asymmetric warfare or imperial over stretch. Occasionally, there are explicit references to suitable literature, like Clausewitz 'On war' or Paul Kennedy's 'Rise and fall of the great powers: economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000'.

Political, sociological and economic analyses and psychological profiles of opponents have to provide the insight that jihadists need to detect weak spots with the enemy and ways to hit him where it hurts (e.g. by reducing public support for war, provoking imperial overstretch, provoking political developments in their own favour or even a regime change). Anthropological knowledge of regions and populations where jihadists are active must enhance support and sympathy for the cause of jihad and a more efficient recruiting and enrolment of new fighters (we might call these the jihadi *PsyOps*-operations).<sup>24</sup>

Lia & Hegghammer see Yusuf al-Ayiri as a major figure in the development of jihadi strategic studies.<sup>25</sup> As media coordinator of al-Qaida - al-Ayiri is the founder of a number of jihadist websites (including Al-Qaeda website Al-Nida) and editor of the online magazine Sawt al-Jihad - he was responsible for a number of strategic studies on the war in Iraq, the jihad in Chechnya and the Philippines, and political modernization logical analysis on Islamic movements. For Reuven Paz, Ayiri posthumously became the main inspiration for the jihad in areas such as Iraq and Chechnya.<sup>26</sup>

In Ayiri's reflections on jihad, religious references are sporadic. He pursues at great length the political, cultural and economic dimensions of the struggle. With references to, inter alia, the memoirs of Nixon, or to the doctrines of Carter and Bush Sr., he advises to gather deeper knowledge about the opponent in order to take more action that is effective.<sup>27</sup> Ayiri wrote about Iraq in terms of a domino theory: the American occupation of the country is one step in a cascade of attacks on the Arab world,

---

<sup>23</sup> *Iraq al-Jihad—Amal wa Akhtar: Tahlil al-Waqi' wa Istishraf lil-Mustaqbal wa Khatawat 'Amaliyyah 'ala Tariq al-Jihad al-Mubarak* [Jihadi Iraq – hopes and risks: analysis of the reality, overview of the future and practical steps on the way of the blessed jihad], [http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00038/\\_Jihadi\\_Iraq\\_\\_Hopes\\_\\_38063a.pdf](http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00038/_Jihadi_Iraq__Hopes__38063a.pdf)

<sup>24</sup> Brachman J., McCants W., 'Stealing al-Qaeda's playbook', in: *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 29, 2006, p. 310.

<sup>25</sup> Lia B., Hegghammer T., 'Jihadi strategic studies: the alleged al Qaida policy study preceding the Madrid bombings', in: *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 27, 2004.

<sup>26</sup> Paz R., 'The impact of the war in Iraq on the global jihad', in: Fradkin H., Haqqani H., Brown E. (ed.), *Current trends in Islamist Ideology*, 1, 2005, p. 41.

<sup>27</sup> Lia B., Hegghammer T., 'Jihadi strategic studies', pp. 363-365; Meijer R., Re-reading al-Qaeda: writings of Yusuf al-Ayiri, in: *ISIM Review*, 18, 2006, pp. 16-17.

culminating in an ultimate conflict between the reprehensible - because secular - democracy and Islam.<sup>28</sup>

In *Stealing al Qaeda's playbook*, J. Brachman and W. McCants, researchers at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, examine the importance of analyzing the products of jihadi strategic studies for gaining insight into the strategic and operational discussions and identify the tactics of jihadists.<sup>29</sup> Brachman & Mc Cants use texts of four jihad strategists that were published on the Internet: Abu Bakr Naji, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Qatada and Abu Mus'ab al-Suri.

Abu Bakr Naji is supposedly not a real person, but a name behind which a number of jihadi theorists hide. Naji is the author of an extensive document ('The management of savagery: the most critical stage through which the umma will pass', 113 pages in the Arabic version) which addresses an issue that is missing in many other jihadist visions. Naji reproves the jihadists for focusing too strictly on the military aspects of their struggle, and keep out of the political consequences of the struggle. He therefore asks them to devote themselves to 'political science' to get a clearer view of what the enemy is up to:

*"Properly understanding the rules of the political game of our opponents and their fellow travellers, and striking a balance between confrontation and cooperation in accordance with sharia politics.*

*We urge that most of the leaders of the Islamic movement be military leaders or have the ability to fight in the ranks, at the very least. Likewise, we also urge that those leaders work to master political science just as they would work to master military science."*<sup>30</sup>

Abu Mus'ab al-Suri shares this view. In his texts, he regrets the lack of ideological awareness among the jihad fighters: *"This is indispensable, since all action has to be based on ideological awareness. Otherwise, the group would be reduced to a militia"*. In his eyes, ideology provides the substructure that distinguishes jihad from ordinary din of arms. Ideological and religious-theological training should constitute the main part of the training of jihadis, while the share of military training should not be larger than 20 to 30%.<sup>31</sup>

We already referred to Al-Suri as the founder of the 'leaderless jihad'. As a result, Brynjar Lia calls Al-Suri the most influential jihadi ideologue of today. *Da'wat al-Moqawma al-Islamiyah* (The call for global Islamic resistance) is Al-Suri's largest work - 1604 pages - and discusses the Afghan jihad against the Coalition forces, including the recruitment of new fighters and their financing, and the influence of this jihad on Islamist movements worldwide. Based on his analysis, he draws some conclusions that should sketch the broad outlines for future battle, which includes freezing the national *tanzim* jihad, but a continuation of the defensive jihad to liberate Islamic territory (like in Iraq or Chechnya). In his opinion, these multi-front wars against a strong enemy are essential to keep the spirit of jihad awake worldwide and to mobilise new recruits. This will give birth to a third generation of jihadis: *"I believe that a new generation of Jihadists is born today in the post 9/11 climate, where Iraq is occupied and the Palestinian uprising has reached a climax, thus leaving it at a crossroads. We are at a juncture where the believers have exhausted all their resources, and the nation stands by as a spectator in relation to their sacrifices because of the compelling silence of the ulama, the oppression of its rulers, and the inability to retaliate."*<sup>32</sup> As a fighter from the second generation of jihadis, al-Suri sees it as his

---

<sup>28</sup> Paz R., 'The impact of the war in Iraq on the global jihad', p. 42.

<sup>29</sup> Brachman J., McCants W., 'Stealing al-Qaeda's playbook', in: *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 29, 2006, pp. 309-321.

<sup>30</sup> Naji A., *The management of savagery: the most critical stage through which the umma will pass*, 2004. Translation by William McCants, commissioned by Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard, 268 p.

<sup>31</sup> Lia B., *The architect of global jihad*, pp. 87, 100.

<sup>32</sup> Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, *Da'wat al-Moqawma al-Islamiyah* ('The call for global Islamic resistance'), cited in Al-Shishani M., 'Abu Mus'ab al-Suri and the third generation of salafi-jihadists', in: *Terrorism Monitor*, 3, 16, 2005, p. 3.

task to acquire the knowledge and expertise of the first generation of leaders, who now are slain or driven out of their solid bases, and to transfer it to this new, third generation of fighters. Hence the importance of his *Call for global Islamic resistance*.<sup>33</sup>

Jihad texts like the 1996 fatwa by bin Laden sometimes discuss tactical and strategic considerations but still include a 'religious' argument or theological reflection on jihad. In contrast, the content of jihadi strategic studies are seen as purely profane and secular.<sup>34</sup> Jihadi strategic studies are therefore referred to as 'second generation' jihadist literature. It is jihadist literature, which emanates from a generation of jihadists that no longer has to legitimise their struggle in religious terms, since they can rely on an extensive body of evidence from previous generations. The jihadi strategic studies emphasise on a pragmatic, political and military approach to the struggle, and breathe a new form of political activism. Because of this combination of political analysis and activism in battle, Roel Meijer estimates that these jihadi strategic studies are currently much more influential on radicalising young salafists than 'old' jihadists like bin Laden or Zawahiri.<sup>35</sup> Will new recruits join the jihad more on political grounds than on the religious aspects that are connected to the jihad? If that would be indeed be the case, the emergence of jihadi strategic studies will have fundamental implications on the way to analyse and combat radicalisation and jihadisation.

## 5. SENSITIVITY FOR DISCOURSES

When we look at discursive action against radicalisation, the battle for the hearts and minds still mainly focuses on the religious-cultural discourse. Little experience exists on handling non-religious, say more 'ideological', aspects that contribute to radicalisation.

A Dutch report on processes of de-radicalisation concluded that de-radicalisation programmes of islamists were successful at an individual level once their ideological involvement in radical movements waned, when they came to see that violence was not the appropriate tactic to reach their objectives, or when they turned away from orthodoxy.<sup>36</sup> Willemse names various interventions to suppress radicalisation, such as the promotion of an attractive alternative body of thought, cooperation with moderate-minded islamists, promotion of consciousness of democracy, and disruption of the circulation of radical ideas.<sup>37</sup> Likewise, Drinkwine recommends more action by the United States on the religious-cultural level, in order to convince Muslims that radical islamists and jihadis are not only threatening 'the West' but also their own societies, religion and culture.<sup>38</sup>

---

<sup>33</sup> McCants W., 'Stealing al-Qaeda's playbook', p. 315.

<sup>34</sup> However, the profanity of these texts should not be overrated. After all, they still refer to a context in which jihad is considered some kind of religious cause. For example, in his overall rational strategic assessment of Central Asia as a potential battleground for jihad ('Muslims in Central Asia and the coming battle of Islam', Kabul, 1999, 41 p.), al-Suri discusses the importance of the region regarding natural resources, favorable geographical conditions for fighting, etc. Suddenly he writes that this will also be the area where the *Mahdi* will fight and win his first battle and announce the End of Times: "In this region to the north of Afghanistan and Transoxiana, the black flags will set out which is when the *Mahdi* is expected to fill the earth with equity and justice, carrying the banner of the people of Islam to the attainment of victory. This will continue till the end of time in *Al Sham* with the Jews and Christians."

<sup>35</sup> Meijer R., 'Re-reading al-Qaeda: writings of Yusuf al-Ayiri', p. 17.

<sup>36</sup> Demant F., Slooman M., Buijs F., Tillie J., *Teruggang en uittrekking. Processen van deradicalisering ontleed*. Den Haag, Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2008, 200 p.

<sup>37</sup> Willemse, R., 'Terrorism and radicalisation. A study in the Dutch context'. In: *Radicalisation in broader perspective*. Den Haag, Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding, 2007, pp.23-33.

<sup>38</sup> Drinkwine B. *The serpent in our garden: Al-Qa'ida and the long war*. Carlisle, US Army War College, 2009, pp. 56-59.

Western approaches to de-radicalisation differ from those practised in some Muslim countries, like in Saudi Arabia. De-radicalisation programmes in Saudi Arabia try to tune down radical opinions and attitudes of imprisoned jihadis. Religious scholars enter into debate with the jihadis try to convince them to put aside their erroneous interpretation of Islam. When they denounce their violent ideology, prisoners are being re-educated into less violent versions of salafism (wahhabism, the official interpretation of Islam) to prepare them for rehabilitation and re-integration into Saudi society.<sup>39</sup>

However, it might be doubted that such an ideological re-orientation in religious term might be sufficient from the perspective of a Western society that is confronted with radicalisation or jihadisation. Even in non-violent salafist currents a core of radicalism remains, which is difficult to reconcile with principles of a secular, liberal society. For these societies, a pro-active approach might be a solution, beyond de-radicalisation, based on an ideological alternative and located outside the religious sphere. Examples from the UK and the Netherland initiate such an approach.

The 'prevent'-workstream of CONTEST2, the British strategy against risks posed by international terrorism, aims to reduce support for terrorism and challenge radicalisation. It calls for communities to "challenge and resist violent extremists", and, among other things, to address grievances by creating space to debate them and to develop policies to "promote equality and tackle racism and bullying".<sup>40</sup>

The Amsterdam city council's programme 'Amsterdam against radicalisation', tries to reduce vulnerability to extremist thought on the short and medium term, by "refuting radical interpretations of religious sources". But for a long term success on de-radicalisation or prevention of radicalisation, society as a whole will be involved in actions that will benefit every member thereof: tackling discrimination, enhancing confidence in politics, combating social isolation, improvement of civil society organisations, ...<sup>41</sup>

Both approaches address the issue of radicalisation or jihadisation not only from a point of view of undesired religious doctrines, but from a wider political perspective of social and individual resilience and development. This might prove a more profound strategy than limiting violent radicalism to a religious issue, as we saw it in the Saudi example.

When we turn to the issue of investigating (developments in) the ideology and discourse of the global jihad and Islamic radicalization, critical discourse analysis offers an interesting approach.<sup>42</sup>

Critical discourse analysis is a practise to analyse language/text with attention to context of the text, rather than on the information that is included in the text. This makes for instance silence or 'missing text' as important as uttered words, for missing text presupposes knowledge to be present with the

---

<sup>39</sup> Boucek C., 'Counter-terrorism from within: assessing Saudi Arabia's religious rehabilitation and disengagement programme', in: *RUSI*, 153, 6, pp. 60-65.

<sup>40</sup> Her Majesty's Government, *Preventing violent extremism: a strategy for delivery*, 2008, 9 p; Her Majesty's Government, *Pursue, prevent, protect, prepare: the United Kingdom's strategy for countering international terrorism*, 2009.

<sup>41</sup> Gemeente Amsterdam, *Amsterdam tegen radicalisering*, 2007, 53 p.

<sup>42</sup> CDA is a form of sociolinguistics, which is interested in the relationship between text (spoken or written, but also non-verbal messages) and social structures, culture and power in society. The term 'critical' refers to a specific way of approaching language, reflection on language ('why did a speaker / writer use certain words and phrases') and interpretation of language (analysis of the relationship between language within the society and the societal structures ) (Young L., Fitzgerald B., *The power of language: how discourse influences society*, London, Equinox, 2006, p. 8.).

More specifically CDA pointed at how discourse is used in matters of exercise of power, especially in situations of social and political inequality, which is established, maintained and reproduced by means of language. In CDA, the researchers examine how discursive social structures are built and how they operate. The relationship can be examined between a discourse that has been wielded and the power relations between speakers / broadcasters and listeners/receivers (e.g. Van Dijk T., 'Critical Discourse Analysis', in: Tannen D., Schiffrin D., Hamilton H. (ed.), *Handbook of Critical Discourse Analysis*, Oxford, Blackwell, 2001, p. 352.)

receiver. When we look for discourses of jihadi ideologies, an analysis of missing text can reveal this implicit, internalised ideological knowledge which might be unknown by others. Counter-discourses can capitalise on the understanding of ideological knowledge to improve the reception of its own text. Additionally, one can look for the manipulative aspects of the jihadi discourse, to get a better insight into the way people become receptive and susceptible to these discourses.

Administrations gradually become more sensitive to the impact of discursive action regarding Muslims, terrorism and jihad.

In May 2008, the US National Counter Terrorism Center prepared an internal document, urging officials and the administration to drop certain terminology that might be offensive to Muslims in general.<sup>43</sup> Based on the principle “It is not what you say, but what they hear”, the 2-page guide recommended to replace words like ‘jihadist’ (which hasn’t the same negative connotation in classical Islam) by religious-cultural less offensive terms like ‘extremist’ or ‘terrorist’. Or, “Use ‘totalitarian’ to describe our enemy. It evokes the correct image of what we face. It is a term understood in the Muslim world”. Indeed a true conclusion, as many muslims in the world experience authoritarian regimes in their own countries. An other recommendation is to avoid references to a ‘clash of civilisations’, just as labelling everything ‘Muslim’, because this “reinforces the “U.S. vs. Islam” framework that Al-Qaeda promotes.” This seems to be a recognition of the ideological similarity of the discourses on global jihad and ‘war on terror’, which now should be de-legitimised.

A few months earlier, the US Department of Homeland Security formulated similar recommendations in a 9-page document ‘Terminology to define the terrorists: recommendations from American Muslims’<sup>44</sup>. “Words matter”, it says, and terminology used by government officials should be “strategic – it should avoid helping the terrorists by inflating the religious bases and glamorous appeal of their ideology”. A list of 9 recommendations, mostly focussing on an ideologically inspired discourse against radicalism and jihadism. The cultural-religious sphere of discourse is not the battleground for a Western government – where it has no legitimacy or credibility- but must be left to the Muslims themselves: “Where our reach is limited, we should strongly encourage Muslim writers, commentators and scholars to use terminology that will drive the debate in a positive direction. While the USG may not be able to effectively use terms like *takfirism*, others certainly can.”<sup>45</sup>

Finally, a policy analysis prepared for the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office comes to the same conclusion that ‘words matter’<sup>46</sup>. The government recognised that “language can be communities at home and abroad – to commit acts of violence.” It finds that “language shifts do not require major policy changes” and that “small changes in Western political language can deny terrorist’s power to use our words against us”. This is truly a discursive – and therefore ideological- approach on strategy rather than a focus on culture or religion.

The examples presented above are the first steps towards a critical approach to discourse, in this case a discourse developed by a Western government and targeted at a wide Muslim audience. They are excellent primary material to be analysed by scholars of critical discourse analysis or critical terrorism studies, who are sensitive to expose the discursive impact of language on perpetuating (hegemonic) power and inequality

---

<sup>43</sup> United States – National Counter Terrorism Communications Center, *Words that work and words that don’t: a guide for counterterrorism communication*, vol. 2, issue 10 (March 14 2008).

<sup>44</sup> United States - Department of Homeland Security, *Terminology to define the terrorists: recommendations from American Muslims*. Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, January 2008.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>46</sup> Armstrong J., Chin C., Leventer U.. *The language of counter-terrorism: when message received is not message intended*. Harvard, Harvard Kennedy School of Governance, 2008.

within society. Critical analysis of how jihadi discourses can contribute to a better understanding how jihad leaders exercise similar power over societies and individuals in Muslim countries or in the West, give an insight in processes of violent radicalisation, improve policies aimed at de-radicalisation and enhance efforts to constitute an inclusive society.

## 6. REFERENCES

Al-Shishani M., 'Abu Mus'ab al-Suri and the third generation of salafi-jihadists', in: *Terrorism Monitor*, 3, 16, 2005, p. 3.

Armstrong J., Chin C., Leventer U., *The language of counter-terrorism: when message received is not message intended*. Harvard, Harvard Kennedy School of Governance, 2008.

Bonner M., *Jihad in Islamic history*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006, 197 p.

Boucek C., 'Counter-terrorism from within: assessing Saudi Arabia's religious rehabilitation and disengagement programme', in: *RUSI*, 153, 6, pp. 60-65.

Brachman J., McCants W., 'Stealing al-Qaeda's playbook', in: *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 29, 2006, pp. 309-321.

Cook, D., *Understanding jihad*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 2005, 259 p.

De Waal A., *Islamism and its enemies in the Horn of Africa*. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2004, 279 p.

DeLong-Bas N., *Wahhabi Islam: from revival and reform to global jihad*. London, I.B. Tauris, 2004, 310 p.

Demant F., Slooman M., Buijs F., Tillie J., *Teruggang en uittrekking. Processen van deradicalisering ontleed*. Den Haag, Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2008, 200 p.

Gemeente Amsterdam, *Amsterdam tegen radicalisering*, 2007, 53 p.

Gerges F., *The far enemy: why the jihad went global*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, 345 p.

Hegghammer T., 'Global jihadism after Iraq war', in: *Middle East Journal*, 60, 1, 2006, pp. 11-32.

Her Majesty's Government, *Preventing violent extremism: a strategy for delivery*, 2008, 9 p

Her Majesty's Government, Pursue, prevent, protect, prepare: the United Kingdom's strategy for countering international terrorism, London, The Stationary Office, 2009, 174 p.

Jansen J., *The neglected duty: the creed of Sadat's assassins and Islamic resurgence in the Middle East*, New York : Macmillan; London : Collier Macmillan, 1986.

Kepel G., *Jihad: the trail of political Islam*. London, I.B. Tauris, 2002, 454 p.

Lia B., *Architect of the global Jihad: the life of al-Qaida strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri*. New York, Columbia University Press, 2008, 510 p.

Lia B., Hegghammer T., 'Jihadi strategic studies: the alleged al Qaida policy study preceding the Madrid bombings', in: *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 27, 2004, pp. 355-375.

Meijer R., Re-reading al-Qaeda: writings of Yusuf al-Ayiri, in: *ISIM Review*, 18, 2006, pp. 16-17.

Naji A., *The management of savagery: the most critical stage through which the umma will pass*, 2004. Translation by William McCants, commissioned by Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard, 268 p.

Paz R., 'The impact of the war in Iraq on the global jihad', in: Fradkin H., Haqqani H., Brown E. (ed.), *Current trends in Islamist Ideology*, 1, 2005, pp.39-49.

Renders M., *De schaduwkant van de maan: islamisme in politiek, economie, maatschappij en hetwereld-systeem*, Gent, Academia Press, 1999.

United States – National Counter Terrorism Communications Center, *Words that work and words that don't: a guide for counterterrorism communication*, vol. 2, issue 10 (March 14, 2008).

United States - Department of Homeland Security, *Terminology to define the terrorists: recommendations from American Muslims*. Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, January 2008, 9 p.

Van Dijk T., 'Critical Discourse Analysis', in: Tannen D., Schiffrin D., Hamilton H. (ed.), *Handbook of Critical Discourse Analysis*, Oxford, Blackwell, 2001, pp. 352-371.

Willemse, R., 'Terrorism and radicalisation. A study in the Dutch context'. In: *Radicalisation in broader perspective*. The Hague, Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding, 2007, pp.23-33.

Young L., Fitzgerald B., *The power of language: how discourse influences society*, London, Equinox, 2006, 325 p.